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Zusammenfassung
Zeitwahrnehmung ist untrennbar mit jeder bewussten Erfahrung verbunden und dennoch
sind die dieser Empfindung zugrundeliegenden kognitiven Mechanismen nur unzureichend
erkla¨rt. Subjektiv wahrgenommene Zeit stimmt oft nicht mit der objektiv vergangenen
Zeit u¨berein, was durch Modelle der Zeitwahrnehmung erkla¨rt werden muss. Zum Beispiel
werden dynamische Reize als la¨nger andauernd wahrgenommen als statische Reize. Die
Divergenz zwischen subjektiver und objektiver Zeitwahrnehmung ist Gegenstand dieser
Arbeit, die in drei empirischen Studien untersucht, wie Zeitwahrnehmung durch den In-
halt eines Zeitintervalls und die durch diesen Inhalt hervorgerufenenen perzeptuellen und
kognitiven Prozesse beeinflusst wird. Dabei werden Paradigmen aus der Forschung zur
visuellen Wahrnehmung mit Aufgaben aus dem Bereich der Zeitwahrnehmung kombiniert
und durch Messungen neuronaler Aktivita¨t mittels Elektroenzephalographie (EEG) erga¨nzt.
Der erste Teil der Arbeitet testet Hypothesen, die von sogenannten sensorischen Mod-
ellen der Zeitwahrnehmung abgeleitet wurden. Diese Modelle basieren auf der Annahme,
dass die Wahrnehmung von Dauer in den selben neuronalen Netzwerken entsteht, die
auch den sensorischen Reiz selbst verarbeiten. Unter dieser Annahme mu¨sste jede Eigen-
schaft des Reizes, welche neuronale Verarbeitung hervorruft, auch zu einem Effekt auf
die wahrgenommene Dauer des Reizes fu¨hren, auch wenn diese Eigenschaft nicht bewusst
wahrgenommen wird. Die Ergebnisse widersprechen dieser Annahme und zeigen, dass
nur Eigenschaften der Reize die auch bewusst wahrgenommen werden einen Einflusss
auf subjektive Dauer haben. Zweitens wurde untersucht, ob die objektive Anzahl an
Vera¨nderungen die ein Reiz wa¨hrend eines Zeitintervalls durchla¨uft die wahrgenommene
Dauer dieses Reizes bestimmt, oder ob die wahrgenommene Dauer sich von der subjektiv
wahrgenommenen Sta¨rke der Vera¨nderung, oder deren neuronaler Verarbeitung ableitet.
In U¨bereinstimmungen mit obigem Befund zeigte sich, dass die subjektiv wahrgenommene
Sta¨rke der Vera¨nderung die subjektive Dauer bestimmt.
Zusammengenommen sprechen diese Befunde gegen die Annahmen sensorischer Mod-
elle der Zeitwahrnehmung, aber lassen sich mit den Annahmen von Modellen vereinbaren,
die eine zentrale innere Uhr beschreiben. Diese sogenannten Modelle der inneren Uhr
mu¨ssen jedoch auch erkla¨ren ko¨nnen, mittels welcher Mechanismen der Inhalt eines Zeit-
intervalls dessen subjektive Dauer beeinflusst. Im dritten Teil der Arbeit wird untersucht,
ob die Dynamik visueller Reize die Zeitwahrnehmung schon wa¨hrend des “Enkodierens”
der Zeit beeinflusst, oder erst spa¨ter wenn eine Entscheidung u¨ber die Dauer des Zeitinter-
valls getroffen wird. Dazu werden elektrophysiologische Korrelate der Zeitwahrnehmung
untersucht. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die neuronalen Korrelate der Zeitwahrnehmung
nicht die zeitliche Verzerrung widerspiegeln, die durch dynamische Reize hervorgerufen
wird. Dies spricht dafu¨r, dass diese Verzerrung auf einer spa¨teren Prozessstufe eintritt.
Insgesamt zeigen die Befunde der drei Studien, das Zeitwahrnehmung sich nicht direkt von
der sensorischen Reizverarbeitung ableiten la¨sst. Der Inhalt eines Zeitintervalls scheint
einen geringeren Einfluss auf die wahrgenommene Dauer des Intervalls zu haben als ur-
spru¨nglich angenommen. Theoretische Implikationen der Befunde werden in Bezug auf
die zugrundedliegenden Modelle diskutiert und Implikationen fu¨r weitere Forschung im
Bereich der Zeitwahrnehmung abgeleitet.
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Summary
Time perception is a basic subjective experience, but the underlying cognitive mecha-
nisms are not well understood. Often, perceived time differs from objective time. The
following work addresses this discrepancy by investigating how perceived time is influ-
enced by the content of a time interval and the perceptual and cognitive processing of
this content. It has been shown that dynamic stimuli are perceived as longer than static
stimuli. Three empirical studies are conducted to assess how visual stimulus dynamics
affect perceived duration. We combine paradigms from vision research with timing tasks
and measures of neural processing using electroencephalogram (EEG). The first part of
this work tests hypotheses derived from sensory models of interval timing, which claim
that duration of a time interval is encoded in the same neural networks that process its
sensory content. According to these models, the “neural energy” expended in the sensory
processing of a stimulus also codes for the perceived duration of that stimulus. If this is
true, even stimulus dynamics that are processed on an automatic sensory level but are not
consciously perceived should affect perceived duration. In contrary, we show that only
consciously perceived stimulus dynamics affect perceived duration, with more perceived
dynamic leading to longer perceived duration. Second, we tested whether the objective
number of changes in sensory input relates to perceived duration, or whether the subjec-
tive saliency of these changes, or their neural processing explains the effect on perceived
duration. In line with the first result, only consciously perceived changes affected per-
ceived duration, but not changes that were not perceived but evoked a neural response
(measured in the electroencephalogram, EEG). These findings argue against the assump-
tion of sensory timing models, but are consistent with models that assume a specialized
internal clock. However, internal clock models do not sufficiently explain why stimulus
dynamics dilate perceived duration. In the third study, we tested whether stimulus dy-
namics affect the stage of temporal encoding as postulated by internal clock models, or
affect duration perception at later processing stages. Since the duration judgment given
by the participant does not allow distinguishing between an effect on the encoding and the
decision stage, we measured neural correlates of temporal encoding in the EEG. We found
that the neural correlates of temporal encoding reflected internal variations in perceived
duration, but not the dilation induced by stimulus dynamics. We therefore argue that
visual stimulus dynamics affect perceived duration after temporal encoding during the
decision process. In sum, our findings show that duration perception is not grounded in
early sensory processing, but is probably achieved by a specialized timing system that can
be biased by the perception of dynamic stimuli. We discuss the theoretical implication of
these findings for theories of time perception, and their implications for further research
in this field.
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The question is important, for, if the experience be what it roughly
seems, we have a sort of special sense for pure time?
A sense to which empty duration is an adequate stimulus;
while if it be an illusion, it must be that our perception of time’s flight,
in the experiences quoted, is due to the filling of the time,
and to our memory of a content which it had a moment previous, and
which we feel to agree or disagree with its content now.
WILLIAM JAMES
(James, 1891, p.619)
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1 Introduction
1.1 The puzzle of subjective time
Time perception is inseparably linked to subjective experience. Every impression has a
duration that we perceive — without any additional effort — together with the impression
itself. Unlike other senses, such as light or sound, no dedicated sensory organ exists
to subserve time perception. There does not even seem to be a physical substrate of
time comparable to light or sound waves that can be extracted from the environment.
Nevertheless, timing is so ubiquitous and effortless that we often become aware of it only
when we sense a mismatch between subjective and objective time, for example when a
watched pot never boils, or as time flies when we are having fun. The mismatch between
objective time and subjective time offers an excellent test case for theories and models of
time perception, which to this day remain challenged by the inherently subjective nature
of time perception (Kelly, 2005).
As expressed by the sayings above, subjective time is greatly influenced by non-
temporal events, for example by the events we perceive during a time interval. The
work described here investigates how the content of a time interval affects the perceived
duration of this interval.
Researchers have spelled out a number of distinctions that allow to classify the
different processes subsumed under the term time perception. This broad term encom-
passes temporal order judgments, simultaneity judgments, rhythm perception, and the
perception of duration (Po¨ppel, 1978). Duration perception is the concept most closely
related to what the lay person refers to when talking about time perception: the subjec-
tive extent of an interval in time. Duration perception has been studied on different time
scales from milliseconds to years, which involve different cognitive and neural mechanisms
(Buhusi and Meck, 2005). This work addresses the time range lasting from hundreds of
milliseconds to seconds. The processes underlying perception of durations in this range
are often referred to as cognitive timing, or interval timing (Hinton and Meck, 1997).
These durations can be accessed consciously (which is difficult for shorter durations), and
can be easily studied experimentally, since they are short enough to be presented repeat-
9
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edly (which is difficult for longer durations). Therefore, perception of durations in the
so called peri-second range has triggered a host of empirical studies. Different models of
how a cognitive system and a biologically realistic brain could account for our perception
of these durations have been described.
1.2 Models of interval timing
Models of interval timing can broadly be divided into two categories: models that assume
specialized timing mechanisms and models that do not assume specialized mechanisms.
Recently, these two different classes of models have been labelled as “dedicated and in-
trinsic models” (Ivry and Schlerf, 2008).
1.2.1 Dedicated models: the internal clock
Dedicated models constitute the more traditional class of models, which were devised in
the light of the information-processing approach. They postulate a modular structure
built around a central timer that has been termed an internal clock. This timer is not
described as a sensory organ which is able to extract time from the environment, but
as an intrinsic organ which generates the organism’s own time. This timer functions
independently of the signal modality (e.g. visual or auditory signals) or the output (e.g.
motor response or verbal judgment).
The first descriptions of models with a central timer can be found in Creelman (1962)
and Treisman (1963). Upon these initial descriptions different varieties have been built
(Gibbon, 1977; Church, 1984; Wearden, 2003). The classical internal clock model (see
Figure 1) comprises three stages: a stage of temporal encoding, a stage of memory pro-
cessing, and a stage of temporal decision making. During temporal encoding, a pacemaker
emits regular pulses which are transferred to an accumulator. Many models also postu-
late a switch between the pacemaker and the accumulator, which governs the amount
of pulses that actually reach the accumulator. After temporal encoding, the pulses are
transferred from the accumulator to a working memory store and are compared to a pre-
viously memorized reference duration. Based on this comparison, a temporal judgment is
generated. Internal clock models offer an intuitively plausible description of the cognitive
mechanisms of interval timing and have been described in mathematical ways (see e.g.
Gibbon, 1977).
10
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TIME INTERVAL 
Reference
Memory
Pacemaker
Switch
Accumulator WorkingMemory
Comparison
Judgment: 
“long” / “short”
Figure 1: A model of the internal clock (adapted from Church (1984) and Wearden
(2004)) Internal clock models postulate three stages of temporal processing.
During the stage of temporal encoding, a pacemaker emits regular pulses that
are transferred to an accumulator unit (displayed as arrows with dotted lines).
Several models also postulate a switch between the pacemaker and the accumu-
lator, regulating the flow of pulses between the two modules. At the memory
stage following temporal encoding, the pulses are transferred from the accumu-
lator to a working memory store. Finally, at the comparison stage, the stored
pulses are compared to a reference duration retrieved from working memory to
obtain a judgment about the elapsed duration.
The failure to localize an internal clock in the brain presents a challenge to internal
clock models. Several candidate structures have been named, such as the cerebellum (Ivry
et al., 2002), basal ganglia (Harrington et al., 1998), supplementary motor area (Macar
et al., 1999), or prefrontal cortex (Lewis and Miall, 2006). Timing seems to recruit many
different brain structures and seems to be achieved by a network rather than by a dedicated
region (Coull et al., 2004).
While the clock as such could not be identified, internal clock models have neverthe-
less brought forward research on brain processes that reflect specific modules of the clock.
Of particular importance to the work presented here is the activity observed in electroen-
cephalographic recordings (EEG) over primary motor areas. A slow negative deflection
over these areas, known as the contingent negative variation (CNV, Walter et al., 1964),
can be observed when participants are expecting an imperative stimulus or are timing an
interval. Several studies have validated the relationship between the CNV component and
perceived duration and it has been proposed that the CNV amplitude reflects the process
11
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of temporal accumulation (Macar et al., 1999; Ng et al., 2011; McAdam, 1966). The CNV
has therefore been termed “an on-line index of timing” (Macar and Vidal, 2004), and can
be used to study the ongoing process of temporal encoding during a temporal interval.
A great advantage of internal clock models — and maybe the main reason behind
their popularity — is their flexibility in explaining and modelling a wide range of findings
observed in different timing tasks. However, the models have also been criticized for being
too flexible in accommodating new findings by including a number of components that
can interact in various ways (e.g. Staddon and Higa, 1999). For instance, a mismatch
between subjective and objective time can be explained by an accelerated clock rate, by
a switch which regulates the flow of pulses from the pacemaker to the accumulator, or by
effects on the comparison process. Part of the work described here addresses the stage
of temporal processing where the mismatch between objective and subjective duration
occurs.
1.2.2 Intrinsic models
Intrinsic models do not postulate a mechanism that is specifically dedicated to timing, but
rather describe timing as an inherent property of neurons or neuronal networks distributed
across the brain. The mechanisms circumscribed under the term intrinsic models are very
diverse and range from mathematical descriptions of ramping activity of single neurons
(Reutimann et al., 2004) to complex interactions across neuronal networks (Mauk and
Buonomano, 2004; Laje et al., 2011). The problem with intrinsic models of interval timing
is that while they are very specific with respect to computational mechanisms that allow
neuronal units to encode time, they do not clearly specify how a coherent representation
of duration is achieved based on these distributed units.
A subclass of intrinsic timing models maintains that duration is encoded by the
neuronal populations that are activated by the content of the time interval. In an influen-
tial article, Eagleman and Pariyadath (2009) proposed a “neural energy account”, which
implies that perceived duration is a function of the neural energy exerted to encode the
stimulus. Evidence for their proposal comes from the combined interpretation of studies
showing that repeated stimuli are judged shorter than novel stimuli (Pariyadath and Ea-
gleman, 2007) and that repeated stimuli evoke a decreased neural response (Grill-Spector
et al., 2006). The neural energy approach can explain a number of findings, for example,
that rare stimuli are perceived as longer than frequent ones (Tse et al., 2004) or that inter-
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vals filled with light or sound appear longer than empty intervals (Rammsayer and Lima,
1991), assuming that the encoding of such stimuli requires different amounts of neural
energy. In order to test this account, one needs an exact definition of “neural energy”.
Eagleman and Pariyadath (2009) remain vague on this point, suggesting that the crucial
energy might, for example, reside in brain areas that encode the sensory content of the
time interval (p.1844).
The proposal that duration is encoded in sensory areas is supported by a number of
findings (for a review see Bueti, 2011). Several studies have shown that low-level attributes
of visual stimuli influence subjective duration, for example stimulus intensity (Matthews,
2011), size (Xuan et al., 2007), or frequency (Kanai et al., 2006). Observing that these
dynamics trigger specific responses already in sensory areas has lead to the suggestion
that temporal processing emerges from the activity during sensory stimulus processing.
Some studies explicitly show that perceived duration of visual stimuli reflects properties
of neurons in the visual system, such as the local adaptation to flicker (Johnston et al.,
2006). Furthermore, timing of visual events can be impaired independently from timing
of auditory events (Bueti et al., 2008), suggesting modality-specific encoding of time.
In sum, dedicated and intrinsic models assess duration perception from two com-
pletely different angles. Dedicated models postulate a specialized system underlying du-
ration perception. In principle, this system could function without any external input
and therefore constitute “a sort of special sense of pure time” (James, 1891). Conversely,
intrinsic models, such as sensory models of interval timing, postulate no such specialized
system. Here, perceived duration emerges from ongoing perceptual processes, like the
encoding of sensory content present during a time interval.
1.3 A sense of time or a sense of change?
A sense of time
Our perception of time is tightly coupled to the content of the respective time interval.
For instance, Guyau (1890) describes how the perception of time depends on the number
and the intensity of stimuli presented during the interval, and the attention dedicated to
them (see also Michon et al., 1988; Roeckelein, 2000).
Can we perceive the duration of an empty interval without any events? Or in the
words of James (1891), do “we have a sort of special sense for pure time ?” (see quote on
13
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p.8 of this document). As described above, an intuitively plausible perspective on interval
timing is one that assumes mechanisms that function independently of perceptual (and
other cognitive) processing (Allan and Kristofferson, 1974). An independent mechanism
of interval timing is supported by the experience that we can assess the duration of an
empty interval, or compare the durations of two such intervals. Furthermore, durations
can be compared across different modalities. Empirical evidence for an independent timing
mechanism is provided by studies showing that perceiving and producing a duration relies
on a common system (Ivry and Hazeltine, 1995), and that timing of visual and auditory
signals follows the same rules (Grondin, 1993). Above, dedicated models of interval timing
that postulate specified timing mechanisms have been described, like an internal clock that
functions independently of other cognitive processes. These models claim that the timer
works based on an internal rhythm (whose nature is still a matter of debate), and that
duration can be perceived independently of the content of a time interval.
Research based on this perspective has dedicated less effort to disentangling the
influences of sensory interval content on perceived duration, and has rather focused on
the mechanisms underlying duration perception. Effects of sensory interval content on
perceived duration are treated as distortions or illusions (Eagleman, 2008). Nevertheless,
approaches that assume a specific timing mechanism also have to explain how perceived
duration is influenced by external factors, like the sensory content of a time interval.
Effects of non-temporal factors present during a time interval on perceived duration
(e.g. Xuan et al., 2007; Brown, 1995; Kanai et al., 2006) pose a challenge for internal
clock models and can be accommodated only by making additional assumptions. One
assumption is that non-temporal magnitude can affect the clock’s speed by enhancing the
arousal of the organism (Penton-Voak et al., 1996). A different explanation of the effect
of non-temporal factors on perceived duration has been brought forward by adding an
attentional switch to the model (Block and Zakay, 1996, 1997; Tse et al., 2004). This
switch controls the transmission of pulses from the pacemaker to the accumulator, and
is itself controlled by the attention allocated to the information that is relevant for the
timing task. Therefore, the more attention is allocated to the stimulus the more pulses
from the pacemaker reach the accumulator, and the longer the duration appears. Finally,
the processing of the sensory content could affect perceived duration at the later stages
in the model, after temporal encoding. It has been suggested that the transfer of the
accumulated pulses to reference memory can induce variation that in turn biases the
14
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temporal decision of the observer (Church, 1984). In sum, a pure sense of time might
exist, generated by an internal clock which is, however, sensitive to influence of non-
temporal factors.
A sense of change
James denies the existence of a pure sense of time, saying that “we can no more intuit
a duration than we can intuit an extension, devoid of all sensory content” (James, 1891,
p.620). Even in the absence of external stimulation, we are always aware of “some chang-
ing process”, be it even internal rhythms such as heart-beat or breath. Thus, he infers that
our perception of time is based on the awareness of change. To illustrate the nature of
change, James cites the work of Mu¨nsterberg (1889), who states that duration perception
relies “upon the feelings of muscular tension and relaxation” [...] that are “primarily in the
muscles by which we adapt our sense-organs in attending to the signals used” (Mu¨nster-
berg, 1889, p.29). James specifies that these muscles can be in the eyes or ears. The term
muscles might be misleading, but the idea that sensory processing provides the basis for
perceived duration precedes the sensory models of interval timing described above, and
provides an important basis for this work.
The idea that the perception of changes during a time interval provides the basis
for perceived duration has greatly influenced the research on duration perception. Fraisse
(1963) even suggested that perceived duration is a function of the number of changes
perceived during a time interval (p.233). To test this assumption, one needs a very clear
definition of the change relevant for duration perception. It is of course not the change
itself that leads to the perception of duration, but the perceptual processes in the brain of
the observer that extract change from the environment, and transform it into quantifiable
units that translate into a percept of duration.
The proposal that the perception of change leads to the perception of duration
immediately evokes the question of what is meant by “perception of change”. Does the
term perception merely imply processing of change by some cognitive system, or does
it imply conscious perception of the change by an observer? This work attempts to
separate the processing of change that does not require (or does not lead to) conscious
perception from the conscious perception of change. If automatic sensory processing of
changes was sufficient for an effect on perceived duration, this would strongly support
models that assume a relationship between sensory processing and perceived duration.
15
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On the contrary, if conscious perception of change was a necessary condition for it to
affect perceived duration, this would argue for models that postulate a mechanism of
timing that is not directly based on automatic sensory processing, and probably functions
completely independently of sensory processing.
Change can imply any dynamic aspect of the content of a time interval, including
changes in intensity and number, or displacement across space. Many studies have shown
that dynamic perceptual properties of the stimuli, such as their frequency (Kanai et al.,
2006), size (Xuan et al., 2007), or speed (Kaneko and Murakami, 2009) influence the
perceived duration of these stimuli. The problem is that we lack a clear definition of
the dynamics relevant for duration perception and an idea of how these dynamics can
be quantified. It has never been explicitly asked which of the various events related to
the processing of stimulus dynamics are relevant for their effect on subjective duration.
Therefore, it is a central endeavour of this work to test whether there is a quantifiable
relationship between the number of changes present in the stimulus, and the perceived
duration of this stimulus. We will address this question with respect to current models
of interval timing which provide different explanations for the effect of stimulus dynamics
on perceived duration.
The question whether perceived duration is inherently bound to the perception of
the sensory content of a time interval can also shed light on the question whether we have
a dedicated sense for time or whether subjective time reflects a percept emerging from
other cognitive processes, such as perceived change.
1.4 Visual perception of change
Although basically any sense could be used to test the relationship between the perception
of change and the perception of duration, this work is restricted to the visual domain.
Visual perception is relatively well understood. We have a general idea about how the
processing of basic visual stimuli is achieved by a cognitive system. We also know which
brain areas are involved in mediating the transfer of physical energy from the environment
to our perception of for example a light. Furthermore, specific neural correlates of the
processing of visual stimuli have been described and can be used as a measure of how the
visual system processes the sensory content of a time interval. These measures can be
tested for their relation to perceived duration, as suggested by sensory models of interval
timing and will allow us to test specific hypotheses about the relationship between visual
16
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perceptual processing and duration perception.
The research on visual perception has developed paradigms that make it possible
to separate different stages of visual processing. Such paradigms are of interest to this
work, since they allow to establish which of the processes related to perceived changes
affect perceived duration. Of particular interest to this work are paradigms that allow to
separate automatic sensory processing from conscious perception. Such paradigms serve
as tools to deliberately assess the influences that each of these processes exerts on duration
perception and test whether conscious perception of change is a necessary condition for
an effect on perceived duration. Examples of such paradigms are the repetition blindness
paradigm (Kanwisher, 1987) and the attentional blink paradigm (Raymond et al., 1992),
as well as the flicker fusion paradigm (Landis, 1954). A detailed description of these
paradigms and reasons why they are a useful tool for the study of time perception will be
given below.
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2 Research questions and hypotheses
This work was designed to explore how the visual content of a time interval and its
perceptual processing affect perceived duration of the time interval. There is no sensory
organ to perceive time. Therefore, it has been suggested that duration perception is based
on the perception of changes occurring throughout the time interval. Furthermore, it has
even been suggested that duration perception is a function of the number of changes
perceived during the time interval.
Defining the relationship between perceptual processing of sensory content and du-
ration perception can also shed light on the underlying cognitive mechanisms of duration
perception A question that is currently dividing research on interval timing is whether
timing is achieved by a specific clock-like mechanism, or whether timing can be achieved
in the absence of such a clock. Clock-like models of interval timing assume a specialized
timing mechanism that can be biased by the sensory content, but is not directly related
to sensory processing. Sensory models of interval timing, on the other hand, postulate
that time emerges from the neural processing of sensory content itself and is therefore
inherently linked to it. To investigate how the sensory content of a time interval and
the cognitive processing of this content affect the mechanisms of duration perception, we
addressed the following questions.
• Does the effect of stimulus dynamics on perceived duration depend on conscious
perception of these dynamics or does it occur even without conscious perception of
the dynamics?
• Does the objective number of changes throughout a time interval explain the per-
ceived duration of that time interval?
• Is the magnitude of the neural processing of the changes an indicator for perceived
duration?
• Do perceived changes affect temporal processing during the encoding of the time
interval or at a later stage?
Hypothesis I: Perceived duration is a function of the number of changes perceived
throughout the time interval.
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If this hypothesis is true, perceiving more changes should lead to a monotonic in-
crease of perceived duration.
Hypothesis II: The neural processes responsible for the perceptual encoding of the
sensory content of a time interval are the basis for duration perception.
If this hypothesis holds, perceived duration should be influenced even by stimulus
dynamics that are only processed on an initial sensory level, but not consciously per-
ceived. In contrary, if perceived duration is influenced only by stimulus dynamics that are
consciously perceived, this argues for an interaction between perceptual processing and
duration perception at higher cognitive levels. Furthermore, if Hypothesis II is true, a
testable relationship between the neural correlates of visual perceptual processing of the
stimulus and its perceived duration should exist.
The studies devised to test Hypotheses I–II did not confirm a close relationship
between sensory processing and perceived duration. Rather, the results pointed towards
mechanisms of interval timing that function independently of sensory perception. Never-
theless stimulus dynamics strongly influenced perceived duration. We therefore devised
a third study, to test how perceived stimulus dynamics interact with the temporal mech-
anisms postulated by the internal clock model. We were specifically interested in the
question whether stimulus dynamics affect perceived duration already during the stage of
temporal encoding or at a later stage. Therefore, we assessed neural correlates of temporal
encoding and tested whether these showed a modulation by the temporal dilation induced
by stimulus dynamics.
Hypothesis III: If perceived stimulus dynamics affect the process of temporal en-
coding during the presentation of the stimulus, they should, besides affecting behavioural
duration judgments, also modulate the neural correlates of temporal encoding.
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3 General methodological approach
This work consists of three independent studies based on a common approach: to combine
paradigms from vision research with timing tasks. Although the tasks differ across the
three studies, all studies use psychophysical methods to assess behavioural duration judg-
ments. Studies II and III additionally use EEG recordings. This section will give a brief
overview of the common methods applied in the three studies. The individual methods
used in each study will be described in the respective summary sections.
3.1 Timing tasks
There are a number of tasks that are classically used to study duration perception in
the peri-second range (for a concise review, see Grondin, 2010). Most common tasks
are comparison and duration bisection tasks. In the comparison task, participants are
presented with two stimuli on each trial and are asked to compare their duration, usually
by answering “shorter” or “longer”. Sometimes, an “equal” option is also included. One of
the stimuli is a standard of constant duration and the other is a test stimulus of constant
or varying duration. The task can be made more or less difficult by varying the difference
in duration between the test stimulus and the standard. When using equal durations for
the standard and test stimuli, one can study internal variation of perceived duration or
the effect of an experimental manipulation, as done in Studies I and II.
In the duration bisection task, participants are first familiarized with two reference
durations: a short and a long duration. During the actual task, they are presented with
only one test stimulus of varying duration on each trial and are asked to judge whether
the stimulus is closer to the short or the long reference duration. By varying the difference
in duration between the reference durations, and/or the spacing of the intermediate test
durations, one can vary the difficulty of the task. Both, the comparison task and the
bisection task can be modelled with psychometric functions, if varying test durations
have been used.
3.2 Psychophysical modelling
The data produced by the comparison task and the bisection task are typically analysed
using psychophysical techniques (as done in Studies I and III). These techniques can even
be used during stimulus presentation to select appropriate test stimuli (done in Study
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II). Psychometric functions are fitted to the data to model the probability of responding
“long” as a function of stimulus duration. The psychometric function has four parameters:
a threshold, also termed the point of subjective equality (PSE), a slope, a lower asymptote
(guess rate) and an upper asymptote (lapse rate) (for a detailed description, see Prins
et al., 2009; Wichmann and Hill, 2001a,b). Of particular importance in timing tasks is the
PSE, which describes the stimulus duration at which the observer is maximally unsure
about whether the duration was long or short (the 50% threshold), and is therefore as likely
to choose either alternative. The PSE is frequently assessed as a measure of perceived
duration (Grondin, 2008). The slope of the psychometric function also provides important
information about the underlying timing behaviour. Steeper slopes (also referred to as
difference limen in the timing literature) are thought to reflect more accurate timing.
3.3 Electroencephalography (EEG)
Duration judgments measured by the timing tasks described above assess the decision of
the observer about the duration of a temporal interval that has already elapsed. However,
different processes might contribute to this decision, making the duration judgment a very
coarse measure of the processes underlying perceived duration. By recording the activity
of the brain during the temporal interval, one can gain additional information about
the processes that precede the duration judgment. Especially the electroencephalogram
(EEG) provides a temporal resolution that is suitable to study the processes during a
short time interval in detail. Studies II and III therefore use EEG recordings in addition
to the assessment of behavioural duration judgments. EEG is used here to access the brain
activity evoked by the stimulus, as a measure of visual (Study II) and temporal (Study
III) processing of the stimulus. In Study II, evoked oscillatory responses (the SSVEP) to
the flickering stimuli were measured to assess the magnitude of the neuronal response to
the flickering stimuli. In Study III, stimulus evoked potentials were measured to assess
the neural correlates of temporal processing of these stimuli.
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4 Summaries of the three experimental studies
4.1 Study I: Attentional selection dilates perceived duration
4.1.1 Background
Study I examines whether an effect of stimulus dynamics on perceived duration is contin-
gent on the conscious perception of these dynamics, by deliberately separating automatic
sensory processing from conscious perception. As described in the Introduction, the re-
search of visual perception has brought forward paradigms that allow to separate the initial
sensory processing of a visual stimulus from attention-based processing at higher levels
that is necessary for conscious perception of the stimulus. Two very similar paradigms
are used in this study: repetition blindness (Kanwisher, 1987) and attentional blink (Ray-
mond et al., 1992). In a rapidly presented stream of visual items (e.g. numbers or letters;
for an illustration see Figure 2 left panel) the observer is required to detect specific target
items. In repetition blindness experiments all targets presented are identical (e.g. the let-
ter X), while in attentional blink experiments the targets are different but belong to the
same category (e.g. numbers presented in a stream of letters). Both paradigms produce
a robust effect: a second target presented shortly (but not immediately) after the first is
frequently missed. The reduced detection rate for the second target has been explained
by a two-stage recognition process: stimuli are first processed on an automatic sensory
level to identify potential target candidates. All stimuli pass this initial step. In a second
step attention is allocated to the stimuli, individuating them as a unique event in time
(Chun, 1997; Treisman and Gelade, 1980). Whenever the second process is still allocated
to the preceding target, a subsequent target does not pass the second step, and fails to
be detected. It has been shown that even undetected targets pass the first stage of au-
tomatic sensory processing, and can for instance facilitate the recognition of subsequent
targets due to priming (Shapiro et al., 1997) or evoke an EEG response reflecting seman-
tic processing. Therefore, both paradigms make it possible to assess on the basis of the
participants’ behaviour whether a target was processed solely on an automatic sensory
level or perceived consciously.
Here, we embedded these two paradigms in a duration comparison task. We mea-
sured whether perceived duration of the whole stream of items was affected by the number
of targets detected in the stream. If target stimuli that are processed only at an automatic
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sensory level affect subjective duration as much as fully processed stimuli, this would in-
dicate that automatic sensory processing of stimulus dynamics is sufficient for an effect
on perceived duration. If, however, only stimuli that are consciously perceived affect
subjective duration, this would show an interaction of the processing of visual stimulus
dynamics and the mechanisms of temporal processing at higher cognitive levels.
The study is based on three independent experiments, conducted to (1) test for an
effect of target detection on subjective duration, (2) specify the conditions under which
this effect occurs, and (3) confirm that the effect is not confounded by the numerical
response given in the target counting task.
4.1.2 Methods
Rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) was used to induce the repetition blindness (Ex-
periments I and II) and attentional blink effects (Experiment III). Duration judgments
based on the RSVP streams were acquired on each trial in a comparison task. The stan-
dard sequence without any targets was presented prior to the test sequence containing
the targets. Participants had to compare the duration of the two sequences in a two-
alternatives-forced-choice task (see Figure 2, left panel).
In Experiment I, the RSVP streams consisted of letters and the letter X was assigned
as the target. Streams contained either one or two targets. Streams lasted 1.6 s (including
16 items lasting 0.1 s each) and standard and test streams were of equal duration. Catch-
trials were intermixed with the experimental trials, in which the duration of the standard
sequence was varied. On each trial, participants reported the number of targets seen and
indicated whether the test sequence lasted longer or shorter than the standard.
The statistical analysis assessed whether the number of targets presented or the
number of targets reported influenced the perceived duration of the sequences. To this
end, trials were assigned one of three post-experimental categories: one target presented
/ one reported, two targets presented / one reported, and two targets presented /two
reported. Duration judgments were compared across these three categories.
Experiment II used the same paradigm as Experiment I, but this time we varied
the duration of the experimental sequence. The variation of the sequence duration made
it possible to fit psychometric curves to the data and model the proportion of trials that
were judged as longer at each sequence duration. Again, the trials were split into three
post-experimental conditions based on the number of targets presented and reported. We
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assessed the threshold and slope parameters of the psychometric curves fitted to the data
from each of the three conditions to test at which sequence duration the temporal dilation
effect was maximal.
Experiment III used the attentional blink paradigm, in which participants had to
detect numbers intermixed with the letter RSVP stream. Instead of counting the targets
participants had to report the identity of one or two targets. Again the sequence duration
was varied and psychometric curves were fitted to the data to model the relationship
between objective and subjective sequence duration.
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Figure 2: Study I: Paradigm and Results (adapted from Herbst et al. (2012), with
permission from Pion Ltd, London, www.pion.co.uk). Left panel: RSVP
paradigm. On each trial we presented a standard sequence containing no
targets and a test sequence containing one or two targets (the letter X). After
the end of both sequences, participants had to answer whether the test sequence
lasted shorter or longer than the standard, and whether they detected one or two
targets. Right panel: Results. The number of targets detected (indicated
on the x-axes) affected the proportion of responding “long” (indicated on the
y-axes). The left and right insets show sequences in which one target was
presented and sequences in which two targets were presented. More targets
detected dilated perceived duration. The solid bars indicate conditions in which
the number of trials was sufficient to perform statistical tests (* indicates p <
0.05). The striped bars indicate conditions for which the number of trials was
too low (e.g. two targets presented / zero reported) to perform statistical tests.
The number of targets presented did not affect perceived duration.
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4.1.3 Results
Experiment I showed the classical repetition blindness effect: a second target in an RSVP
stream was detected less often than a single target and its detection depended on the
temporal spacing of the two targets. Importantly, the number of detected targets affected
the subjective duration of the whole RSVP stream: streams in which two targets were
detected were perceived as longer (depicted in Figure 2, right panel). The number of
targets presented did not affect subjective duration of the stream, meaning there was
no difference in perceived duration between the conditions one target presented / one
reported and two targets presented / one reported.
Experiment II showed that duration judgments reflected the actual sequence dura-
tion. Furthermore, the results confirmed the temporal dilation effect found in Experiment
I and showed that the effect mostly occurred at intermediate sequence durations. At in-
termediate durations, the duration of the test sequence is most similar to the duration
of the standard, which makes the duration judgment task most difficult. The results of
Experiment II rule out a duration-independent response bias, which supposedly would
have caused equal dilation at all sequence durations.
Experiment III showed a classical attentional blink effect: a second target was de-
tected less often than a first target (of different identity). The results show that even
when the task was to report the identity of the targets and not their number, the number
of identified targets affected the subjective duration of the sequence. This shows that
the temporal dilation effect found in the preceding experiments is not confounded by
the numerical response in the target counting task. Again, the effect was maximal at
intermediate sequence durations.
4.1.4 Discussion
The three experiments summarized here constitute a novel approach to the study of inter-
val timing. For the first time the effects of automatic stimulus processing and conscious
perception of these stimuli are assessed in one paradigm. We demonstrated that the per-
ceived duration of a sequence of items was affected by the number of targets detected
in the stream, but not by the number of targets presented. This finding indicates that
only stimuli which traversed the full processing stream and reached consciousness dilated
subjective duration. The results are in line with the suggestion that the number of per-
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ceived changes determines the duration of a time interval (Fraisse, 1963). They refine
this suggestion, showing that only consciously perceived changes contribute to perceived
duration.
The finding that the effect of stimulus dynamics on perceived duration is contingent
on conscious perception of these dynamics is a first hint that perceived duration of visual
stimuli does not emerge from sensory stimulus processing of these stimuli in visual areas.
The findings can be explained by an internal clock model that includes an attentional
switch (Block and Zakay, 1997; Church, 1984). According to this model attention allo-
cated to the content of a temporal interval enhances the number of pulses flowing from a
pacemaker (through the switch) into the accumulator and therefore the interval is judged
as longer. Similar results have been reported for odball stimuli, which attract enhanced
attention and are perceived as dilated (Tse et al., 2004).
Study I was designed to distinguish between the effects of perceptual stimulus pro-
cessing probed at different levels on perceived duration of the same stimuli. A critical
point that should be raised is that we only assumed that missed targets were still processed
at an automatic sensory level, but did not explicitly test this assumption. Therefore, we
conducted a second study, in which we added a measure of the neural processing of visual
stimulus dynamics, in order to explicitly assess the magnitude of the neural response to
dynamic stimuli and its relation to the perceived duration of the same stimulus.
4.2 Study II: How long depends on how fast - perceived flicker
dilates subjective duration
4.2.1 Background
Study II was conducted to separate the effects of the objective rate of stimulus dynamics
from the neural processing, as well as from the conscious perception of these dynamics. To
examine the relationship between stimulus dynamics and perceived duration we studied
the effect of visual flicker on subjective duration. We chose visual flicker, because it
has been shown to affect subjective duration (Kanai et al., 2006) and because flickering
stimuli allow to quantify objectively the amount of change present in the stimulus as
the temporal frequency of the flicker. Furthermore, the sensory visual processing of flicker
can be assessed by a well-defined neural correlate, the steady state visual evoked potential
(SSVEP) measured in the EEG.
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Two thresholds for flicker perception can be assessed: the perceptual flicker fusion
threshold (Landis, 1954), and the neural SSVEP threshold. The perceptual flicker fusion
threshold is the highest frequency at which an observer consciously perceives the flickering.
The SSVEP threshold is the highest frequency that evokes a frequency-specific neural
response in the EEG. Importantly, the individual SSVEP threshold is often higher than
the individual flicker fusion threshold, which indicates that there is a range of frequencies
that are processed as flicker on an early sensory level, but not consciously perceived as
flicker (Gur and Snodderly, 1997; Jiang et al., 2007). We were especially interested in
whether flicker in this range of frequencies affects perceived duration.
We assessed perceived duration of flickering stimuli at a broad range of frequencies
below, in between, and above the flicker-fusion and SSVEP thresholds. This allowed us to
test three conflicting assumptions concerning the relationship between the processing of
visual stimulus dynamics and perceived duration (see Figure 3): (1) Perceived duration is
related to the objective frequency. This assumption would be supported by a monotonous
linear increase of perceived duration with flicker frequency. This account does not specify
whether the effect lasts until the flicker fusion threshold or the SSVEP threshold (visual-
ized in Figure 3, left panel). (2) Perceived duration is related to the subjective saliency
of the flicker (i.e. its subjective strength), which would predict the strongest dilation
effect at lower frequencies (visualized in Figure 3, middle panel). (3) Perceived duration
is related to the sensory processing of the flicker, which would predict that even flicker
frequencies that are not consciously perceived as flicker dilate subjective duration as long
as they evoke a neural response (visualized in Figure 3, right panel). Furthermore, sensory
models of interval timing predict that the neural energy evoked by the encoding of the
stimulus is related to its perceived duration. We therefore tested whether the amplitude
of the SSVEP is related to perceived duration.
4.2.2 Methods
We presented flickering visual stimuli to assess the influence of sensory visual processing
on duration perception. Flicker was presented with custom-built flicker goggles, which
allowed to stimulate the whole visual field on both eyes in parallel, and at a broad range
of frequencies. Three measures of interest were acquired in three experimental phases.
First, we assessed the SSVEP threshold as the highest frequency at which we can
measure a frequency-specific EEG response. Therefore, we presented 30 s of flickering
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Figure 3: Study II: Three accounts describing the hypothetical effect of flicker
frequency on perceived duration (adapted from Herbst et al. (2013)). We
hypothesized that the effect of flicker on perceived duration could be deter-
mined by (1) the objective frequency of the flicker (left panel), leading to a
monotonous increase of perceived duration with flicker. This account does not
specify whether the effect lasts until the flicker fusion threshold or the SSVEP
threshold. (2) The effect of flicker on perceived duration could be determined by
the subjective saliency of the flicker (i.e. the subjective strength of the flicker,
see middle panel). This would lead to a larger dilation effect at slow frequen-
cies. (3) The effect of flicker on perceived duration is determined by the neural
response to the flicker (right panel). This would lead to an effect of flicker on
perceived duration, even beyond the flicker fusion threshold.
light at frequencies ranging from 8 to 166 Hz. SSVEP were measured as the amplitude of
the power spectrum at the stimulation frequency. Using a bootstrap procedure, we tested
whether a given frequency evoked a significant SSVEP.
Second, we assessed the behavioural flicker fusion threshold. We presented 2 s of
flickering light at the same frequency range as above and asked participants to rate each
stimulus as flickering versus steady. We fitted psychometric functions to the proportion
of responding “flicker” and quantified the flicker fusion threshold as the frequency which
was perceived as steady in at least 90% of all trials.
Third, we measured the perceived duration of the flickering stimuli at each frequency.
On each trial we presented a 2 s standard stimulus (166 Hz, which was perceived as steady)
and a test stimulus of varying duration and frequency (the order of standard and test
stimuli was randomized). We used an adaptive staircase procedure to adjust the duration
of the test stimulus on each trial and converted the resulting parameter estimates to an
absolute measure of perceived duration. Finally, we tested at which frequencies flicker
affected perceived duration with respect to the flicker fusion threshold and the SSVEP
threshold.
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threshold.
4.2.3 Results
Visible flicker strongly dilated perceived duration (by about 30% at 4 Hz). The dilation
effect decreased linearly with increasing flicker frequency and disappeared around the
flicker fusion threshold (at about 50 Hz). After this threshold, there was no effect of
flicker on perceived duration even though we measured a significant SSVEP amplitude at
higher frequencies (up to 87 Hz on average). The results support an effect of perceived
flicker strength (not objective frequency) on perceived duration (see Figure 4). Correlation
analyses showed that perceived duration was related to the individually perceived saliency
of the flicker: a participant who was more likely to perceive a given frequency as flicker,
was also more prone to judge the stimuli of this frequency as longer. For the SSVEP
amplitude, we did not find a similar relation: participants who showed a larger SSVEP
amplitude in response to a given frequency did not perceive the stimuli of this frequency
as longer (nor as shorter; there was no correlation).
standard
p
e
rc
e
iv
e
d
 d
u
ra
ti
o
n
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
1
0.6
0.8
0.4
0.2
0
-0.2
fl
ic
k
e
r 
fu
s
io
n
th
re
s
h
o
ld
S
S
V
E
P
th
re
s
h
o
ld
Figure 4: Study II: Results (adapted from Herbst et al. (2013)). Perceived duration
at each frequency. Flicker dilated perceived duration (indicated on the y-axis)
most strongly at the slowest frequencies (indicated on the x-axis). The effect
decreased linearly with increasing flicker frequency and was present only until
the flicker fusion threshold. In accordance with the subjective saliency account
(2, see Figure 3), the subjective strength of the flicker determines the effect
of flicker on perceived duration. The gray shade depicts the 95% confidence
interval of the estimate of perceived duration. The vertical dashed lines indicate
the average flicker fusion threshold and the average SSVEP threshold. The
horizontal dashed line indicates the perceived duration of a standard stimulus
which was always perceived as steady.
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4.2.4 Discussion
The results of Study II show that perceived duration is related to the conscious perception
of flicker, but not to its objective frequency, or the neural response evoked by the flicker.
Our findings show that stimulus dynamics significantly affected perceived duration, but
this effect was contingent on the subjectively perceived strength of the flicker and not
on the objective amount of changes presented. A relationship between neural processing
of the flicker and perceived duration, as suggested by sensory timing models, was not
found. These findings argue against the assumptions derived from sensory models of
interval timing. They are, however, consistent with an internal clock model. The finding
that the dilation effect was largest for frequencies which were subjectively perceived as
strongest supports the assumption that flicker enhances attention, which affect various
modules of an internal clock. It has been suggested that flickering stimuli enhance the
speed of the pacemaker of the internal clock, which then emits more pulses during a given
time interval (Matthews, 2013). Second, it is conceivable that attention acts on a switch
between the pacemaker and the accumulator of the clock (Zakay, 2000), which results in
the transmission of more pulses from the pacemaker to the accumulator. Third, it is also
possible that flicker does not at all affect the stage of temporal encoding, but rather affects
duration perception at the memory or decision level. These stages of temporal processing
cannot be distinguished based on the results of the present study. It therefore remains
unclear at which processing stage the flicker affected the mechanisms of interval timing.
In Study III, we tested whether the flicker dilates subjective duration during temporal
encoding or at a later stage.
4.3 Study III: Flicker-induced time dilation does not modulate
electrophysiological correlates of temporal encoding
4.3.1 Background
Study III tests assumptions derived from dedicated models of interval timing, which postu-
late three stages of temporal processing. The first stage represents the process of temporal
encoding, during which temporal pulses emitted by a pacemaker are counted by an accu-
mulator (also termed the clock stage). Temporal encoding unfolds throughout the time
interval, or at least until a criterion duration has elapsed, followed by a memory stage,
at which the accumulated pulses are transferred to a working memory store. At a third
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stage, the accumulated pulses are compared to a previously memorized reference duration.
Based on the results of the preceding study, we asked if flicker affects duration
perception during temporal encoding or whether flicker rather affects the memory or
comparison stage after the end of the interval. By assessing just the behavioural response
of the participant, these two alternatives cannot be distinguished. Rather, one needs
to measure the ongoing process of temporal encoding during stimulus presentation. If
flicker dilates duration perception during temporal encoding, it should also affect the
neural correlates of temporal encoding. If flicker, however, affects perceived duration at
the memory or decision level, the neural correlates of temporal encoding should not be
affected by the flicker.
4.3.2 Methods
Flickering stimuli were presented (with the same method as described above), to induce
a temporal dilation effect. In this study, we presented stimuli at 4 and 31 Hz, frequencies
which had shown to affect perceived duration in the previous study, and at 250 Hz which is
known to be perceived as steady. The stimuli were presented in a duration bisection task
(Grondin, 2008), in which participants were first familiarized with two reference durations
(0.5 and 3.5 s). During the experiment, their task was to categorize stimuli of intermediate
durations (from 0.5 to 3.5 s) as either short or long.
We tested whether flicker affected the duration judgments obtained in the bisection
task by fitting psychometric functions to the data from the three flicker conditions mod-
elling the proportion of “long” responses as a function of stimulus duration. We compared
the point of subjective equality (PSE) across the three flicker conditions. The PSE in-
dicates the criterion duration, at which participants can decide that the stimulus is not
short, and therefore must be long. We also compared different models based on the psy-
chometric function to test whether the flicker affects only the threshold of the curve or also
the asymptotes. An effect on the threshold would indicate that flicker dilates perceived
duration, equivalent to a physical increase in the stimulus’ duration.
The event-related EEG data was analysed with a hierarchical linear regression ap-
proach (Pernet et al., 2011). This approach allows to analyse single trial data (and not
reduce variance by averaging) and to include potentially confounding factors in the re-
gression model. We specified flicker (three levels) and subjective duration (the response
given by the participant, two levels) as factors of interest and included stimulus duration
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as an additional factor (seven levels). This approach allowed to use the data from all trials
in the same model and estimate potential effects at each time point and electrode. To
isolate neural correlates of temporal encoding, we contrasted the data from trials judged
as long versus short. In a subsequent step, we tested for a an effect of flickering versus
steady stimuli. If flicker affects temporal encoding, flicker should also affect the neural
correlates of temporal encoding.
4.3.3 Results
Both, the 4 and the 31 Hz flicker significantly affected duration judgments, shown by a
leftward shift of the PSE (see Figure 5, left panel). The modelling of the behavioural data
shows that flicker affected mostly the threshold of the curve, but not the asymptotes.
This indicates that flicker dilated perceived duration equivalent to an actual increase in
physical stimulus duration.
The EEG data showed a clear correlate of temporal encoding: an enhanced nega-
tivity with a fronto-central topography, whose amplitude was larger for stimuli judged as
“long” compared to stimuli judged as “short” (depicted in Figure 2, right panel). This
effect occurred prior to the PSE, indicating that it occurred before participants formed
a duration judgment. We interpret this effect as a modulation of the amplitude of a
contingent negative variation (CNV, Walter et al., 1964) evoked by the timing task. Sur-
prisingly, flicker did not affect the CNV amplitude, which indicates that flicker might not
affect temporal encoding. We tested an additional model in which we removed the factor
response to assess whether a potential effect of flicker was nested in the response effect.
Still, no effect of flicker on the CNV could be found. In sum, the results show that flicker
strongly dilates perceived duration, but suggest that this effect does not occur during
temporal encoding.
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Figure 5: Study III: Behavioural and EEG results (adapted from Herbst et al. (2014)
with permission from Springer-Verlag GmbH). Left panel: Behavioural re-
sults: Psychometric functions modelling the proportion of “long” responses as a
function of the actual sequence duration. The blue (solid) curve depicts the data
from the 250 Hz stimuli, which were perceived as steady. The green (dashed)
and red (dotted) curves depict the data from the 31 Hz and 4 Hz conditions, re-
spectively, in which the stimuli were perceived as flicker. Flicker led to a leftward
shift of the psychometric function, indicating that it dilated perceived duration.
The horizontal lines at the midpoint of each of the functions indicate the 95%
confidence intervals. Right panel: Illustration of the event related response
evoked by the stimuli in this task. Perceived duration affected the amplitude of
the CNV component, which is a prolonged negative deflection. Trials judged as
“long” (blue line) showed a larger CNV amplitude than trials judged as “short”
(green line). Note that in the actual research article, we analysed the data with
a general liner model approach, but, for reasons of simplicity, here we show the
unmodelled response. Only the data from the 2 s duration are displayed; data
were low-pass filtered (at 3 Hz) for better visibility.
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4.3.4 Discussion
In this study, we assessed the neural correlates of temporal encoding based on the frame-
work of an internal clock. We tested whether stimulus dynamics affect the process of
temporal encoding. Flicker strongly dilated perceived duration, but despite a very robust
analysis, we did not find an effect of flicker on the neural correlates of temporal encoding.
We isolated the CNV component as a neural correlate of temporal encoding. In
earlier studies the CNV has been described as a neural correlate of temporal encoding and
has been specifically linked to the accumulator described in internal clock models (Macar
et al., 1999). By showing that the CNV amplitude reflects perceived duration, our results
contribute to the ongoing discussion whether the CNV amplitude can be understood as a
neural correlate of time perception (Kononowicz and van Rijn, 2011; van Rijn et al., 2011).
Our findings argue for a distinction between internal variation of perceived duration and
experimentally induced variations of perceived duration. The CNV amplitude seems to
reflect only the first type of variation, while effects of stimulus dynamics might affect
temporal processing at later stages.
There are a number of possible reasons that may explain why we did not find an
effect of flicker on the CNV amplitude. Some of them concern technical issues, such
as the fact that flicker induced a strong response in the EEG data, which might have
interfered with the comparison of the data between the flicker conditions. However, it
is also conceivable that flicker does not affect temporal processing during encoding but
affects perceived duration at a later stage. These later stages of temporal processing
are less explored than the process of temporal encoding (Wearden, 2004). It has been
shown that contextual variables can selectively act at the stage at which the accumulated
duration is stored in memory and compared to a previously memorized reference duration
(Meck, 1983; Cai and Wang, 2014). Therefore, we tentatively assume that flicker affected
perceived duration at the later stage of the process. However, more research is needed to
show that stimulus dynamics, such as flicker, really affect the memory stage of temporal
processing, and to identify the neural correlates of this stage.
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5 General discussion
5.1 Summary of results
Three independent studies were conducted to assess how the visual content of a time
interval along with the sensory and cognitive processing triggered by this content influence
the perceived duration of the time interval.
Study I confirms previous reports of temporal dilation induced by dynamic stimuli.
Importantly, we found that only stimuli that were consciously perceived dilated duration
perception, while the stimuli that were (presumably) only processed at the sensory level
did not. These findings support the assumption that perceived duration is a function of
the number of consciously perceived changes during the time interval. The results suggest
that temporal dilation was induced by the attentional selection of the stimuli.
Study II tested assumptions derived from sensory models of interval timing by mea-
suring neural correlates of sensory stimulus processing. Frequencies that were consciously
perceived as flickering led to a dilation of perceived duration. Furthermore, the dilation
effect was correlated with the subjective strength of flicker perception. Opposing the key
assumption of sensory timing models, neural correlates of early sensory processing of vi-
sual flicker were not related to subjective duration. In line with the results of Study I,
we interpret these findings as an interaction between stimulus dynamics and subjective
duration at cognitive rather than sensory processing levels.
Study III showed that the amplitude of the contingent negative variation (CNV),
identified as a neural correlate of temporal encoding, was not modulated by flicker-induced
time dilation. The CNV amplitude reflected only internal variation of perceived duration.
Since flicker did not affect the CNV amplitude, it is conceivable that flicker does not
affect the process of temporal encoding, but rather affects the mechanisms of duration
perception at later stages.
The combined results suggest that the relationship between sensory processing of the
content of a time interval and perceived duration of this time interval was overestimated.
The effect of stimulus dynamics on duration perception depends on conscious perception
of these dynamics. In light of the results presented here, it is difficult to maintain the
assumption of a direct connection between early sensory stimulus processing and subjec-
tive duration. Therefore, we seem to have a sense of time that functions independently of
sensory processing, rather than a sense of change that is directly coupled to the sensory
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content perceived during a time interval. To integrate our findings, the mechanisms of
interval timing must incorporate an interaction between stimulus dynamics and subjective
duration at a higher processing level, which at the moment is only achieved explicitly by
so-called dedicated models of interval timing.
Our results are in line with the assumption of a centralized timing mechanism that
is not directly coupled to perceptual processing in sensory areas, but can be affected by
perceptual processing of visual stimuli at cognitive levels. In particular, the results of
Study III can be better explained in the framework of dedicated timing models, which
assume two stages of temporal processing, rather than by distributed timing models,
which do not explicitly assume two stages. Although numerous alternative models have
been proposed, the idea of the internal clock is still present and has not been replaced by
a dominant alternative model. As John Wearden, a major advocate of the internal clock
model, puts it: “one might say that if people don’t have a pacemaker-accumulator internal
clock, they certainly behave as if they do, so any model which replaces this clock idea
will have to account for the data which seems to support pacemaker-accumulator clocks so
compellingly” (Wearden, 2003).
In the following section, selected findings will be discussed and integrated, going
beyond the discussion of each individual study in the previous section. I will discuss the
role of attention in temporal processing, which — as suggested by the findings of Study
I — might be more important than one might assume based on the limited discussion of
this factor in the timing literature. I will discuss why our findings from Studies I and
II do not support sensory models of interval timing, and how the assumptions of these
models could be refined. The fourth and fifth discussion points are dedicated to the
specific processes postulated by internal clock models which were addressed in Study III:
temporal accumulation and temporal memory and decision making processes. Finally,
I will raise some limitations of the Studies presented and the approach to the study of
timing in general, and provide suggestions on how to improve the research on timing.
5.2 Effects of attentional processing on duration perception
The results of Study I suggest that attention allocated to the stimuli in a sequence resulted
in temporal dilation of the whole sequence. Effects of attention have received surprisingly
little consideration in the study of interval timing. Effects of attention on perceived du-
ration have been discussed in the resource-sharing framework, under the assumption that
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temporal tasks compete for resources with other ongoing tasks (Buhusi and Meck, 2009).
According to these so-called resource-sharing models, a concurrent task should shorten
perceived duration, because it leaves fewer resources for the timing task. Sequences in
which additional items attracted attention should therefore be perceived as shorter as
compared to sequences in which fewer items attracted attention. As opposed to this,
we found dilation of perceived duration for sequences which received enhanced attention.
Therefore, our findings show that the target detection task and the concurrent duration
judgment task do not compete for resources, but rather share the same resource. It seems
plausible that attention allocated to the stimulus conveys information that is then used
by the mechanisms of interval timing to form an inference on the elapsed duration.
Concerning the results of Studies II and III, it is possible that attention mediates the
effect of flicker on perceived duration. It is likely that flickering stimuli attract attention
more than static stimuli and that attention is responsible for the dilation effect. Although
the exact relationship between flickering stimuli and attention remains unknown, flicker-
ing stimuli are often used and interpreted as warning signals (Berg et al., 2007), indicating
that they attract attention more than static stimuli. Evidence that stimulus-directed at-
tention affects perceived duration comes from the combined interpretation of two studies:
Wittmann et al. (2010) found temporal dilation only for looming but not for receding
stimuli. Franconeri and Simons (2003) report that moving and looming stimuli attract
attention, while receding objects do not. This double dissociation supports the hypothesis
that attention allocated to the content of a time interval is closely related the interval’s
perceived duration.
The psychophysical analyses of Studies I and III show that the effects of attentional
selection and conscious flicker perception on perceived duration resemble the effect of
sustained attention on stimulus contrast (Carrasco et al., 2004; Ling and Carrasco, 2006).
In contrast detection studies, this effect is described as a “contrast gain” and is interpreted
as equivalent to an enhancement of the physical stimulus contrast due to attention. In
the domain of timing, this effect is equivalent to a “duration gain”, equivalent to an
enhancement of the physical stimulus duration through attention.
In light of pacemaker-accumulator models attentional effects on perceived duration
could be explained as an acceleration of the clock rate through attention (Tse et al.,
2004), or by an attentional switch that enhances the flow of pulses from the pacemaker
to the accumulator (Block and Zakay, 1997). The problem is that the two alternatives
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cannot be easily distinguished here, since both would result in a greater number of pulses
accumulated. The results of Study III suggest that neither of the two options applies
and that the dilation effect occurs not during temporal encoding but at later stages of
temporal processing (see discussion below).
In the framework of distributed timing models, areas whose activity is enhanced
by attention could provide information about their duration. Obviously, the problem
with this assumption is that it is difficult to quantify and measure attention. Future
studies could target the activity in the fronto-parietal attention network (Corbetta, 1998;
Ptak, 2012) and test for a relation between the magnitude of activity in this network and
perceived duration.
5.3 Evidence contradicting sensory timing models
In part, this work was conducted to test specific assumptions derived from sensory models
of interval timing (Bueti, 2011). These models hold that perceived duration is encoded
in the neural activity expended in perceptual processing of the content of a time interval
(Bueti, 2011; Eagleman and Pariyadath, 2009). Under this assumption, every aspect of
the stimulus that triggers a neural response should also affect the stimulus’ perceived
duration (Bruno et al., 2010; Johnston et al., 2006).
This prediction is contradicted by the finding of Study II, where visual flicker that
evokes a frequency-specific neural response but no conscious perception did not affect
perceived duration. The highest visual area that is believed to be able to process flicker
above the flicker fusion threshold is V4 (Jiang et al., 2007). Since viewing flicker above the
flicker fusion threshold did not affect perceived duration, it seems unlikely that duration
perception emerges from the activity of any of these low level visual areas. On the contrary,
the results of Studies I and II argue for an interaction between visual processing and
perceived duration at cognitive levels of perceptual processing.
It is conceivable that perceived duration is encoded in cortical areas higher up the
visual processing stream, for example in the frontal eye fields. In a recent report Mayo
and Sommer (2013) show that the response strength of individual neurons (and neuronal
populations) in monkeys’ frontal eye fields is correlated with temporal duration judgments
of short durations (shorter than 0.5 s). Frontal eye field activity has also been related to
visual awareness (O’Shea and Walsh, 2004) and visual attention (Armstrong and Moore,
2007), but is still specifically related to the processing of visual stimuli (for reviews see
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Paus (1996) and Squire et al. (2012)). The frontal eye fields have been described as part
of the fronto-parietal attention network (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Corbetta, 1998;
Ptak, 2012), suggesting a relation between attentional processing in this area and dura-
tion perception as evoked above. Further research could therefore target the relationship
between the activation of the frontal eye fields and the perceived duration of visual stimuli
in humans, possibly including a manipulation of attention.
Another assumption derived from sensory models of interval timing and the neu-
ral energy approach (Eagleman and Pariyadath, 2009) claims that the magnitude of the
neural response to a stimulus codes for the perceived duration of the stimulus. This as-
sumption has been assessed in Study II, but no correlation between the magnitude of
individual SSVEP responses evoked by flicker and perceived duration was found, even
at frequencies at which flicker was clearly visible. Of course, this does not completely
disprove a relationship between sensory processing and perceived duration. The relation-
ship between the magnitude of the visual response and the perceived duration could be
mathematically more complex (Ahrens and Sahani, 2011). Furthermore, it could be that
the phase, rather than the amplitude of the periodic response triggered by the flickering
stimulus contains information relevant for perceived duration. Evidence about the encod-
ing of temporal aspects in the phase of neuronal oscillations comes from recent reports,
linking the phase of neural oscillations to temporal expectations (Rohenkohl and Nobre,
2011) and the perception of rhythm (Henry and Herrmann, 2013).
As stated in the Introduction, the neural energy approach does not provide distinct
hypotheses about the nature of the neural activity in which durations are encoded. The
idea that duration perception is derived from the activity related to sensory processing
of the stimulus is only one interpretation of this account. The large number of processes
and regions whose neural activity could be relevant for timing makes it almost impossible
to conclusively test this approach. It is even conceivable that the activity containing the
code for perceived duration is largely distributed across the whole brain and relies on
dynamics that are difficult to assess with techniques currently available for neuroimaging.
5.4 Ramping neural activity reflects temporal accumulation
Study III provided insights into the neuro-cognitive mechanisms of temporal encoding,
which seem to cumulate in the amplitude of the CNV. Earlier studies have described the
CNV component as related to the accumulation of temporal pulses (Macar et al., 1999;
39
5.4 Ramping neural activity reflects temporal accumulation GENERAL DISCUSSION
Macar and Vidal, 2002) in pacemaker-accumulator models. Larger CNV amplitudes re-
flect subjectively elapsed time, with more negative amplitudes reflecting longer perceived
duration. However, the CNV amplitude seems to reflect only internal variation in per-
ceived duration, but does not appear to reflect the temporal dilation effect induced by the
dynamic stimuli. Recently, a failed attempt to replicate the findings reported by Macar
et al. (1999), undertaken by Kononowicz and van Rijn (2011) evoked a discussion about
whether the CNV amplitude is a specific correlate of temporal processing, or whether
it generally reflects response preparation. Our findings contribute to this discussion by
showing that the amplitude of the CNV is specifically related to the internal variation of
perceived duration during a time interval.
Slow changes of neural activity, as represented by the CNV, appear to be a bio-
logically and theoretically plausible mechanism for temporal processing. For instance,
Reutimann et al. (2004) showed that single neurons can code for durations much longer
than the individual firing rate by changes in the magnitude of their response across time.
It has also been shown mathematically that patterns of firing within neuronal popula-
tions can code for duration (Buonomano and Laje, 2010; Laje et al., 2011). Ramping
neuronal activity related to subjective time has been studied experimentally in monkeys
(Mita et al., 2009) as well as in humans (Wittmann, 2013). In sum, slowly accumulating
activity appears to be a good model for the accumulation of duration over a time interval.
The CNV is typically measured at fronto-central electrodes and has been ascribed
to the activation of the supplementary motor area (SMA, Macar et al., 1999), which is
one of the key candidates for brain areas involved in timing. A recent comprehensive
meta-analysis (based on different imaging techniques) concluded that the SMA was the
only region activated across different timing tasks (Wiener et al., 2010). Furthermore,
recordings from preSMA and SMA in monkeys, (Mita et al., 2009) have shown that
ramping activity in single neurons located in these regions codes for perceived duration.
In sum, the SMA seems to play a key role in temporal processing, reflected by
ramping activity measured in this region during timing tasks. The emission of pulses
might be distributed amongst many areas, depending on the content of the relevant time
interval, the task used to study timing, or other factors like attention allocated to the
stimulus. However, the accumulation might take place in motor areas, like the SMA in a
centralized rather than distributed way.
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5.5 Temporal processing after encoding
The observations of Study III can be best explained by a model that separates the stage of
temporal encoding from the stage at which the temporal information is transformed into a
temporal decision. Such a distinction is provided by dedicated models of interval timing,
which postulate that after temporal encoding, accumulated information is transferred to
a representation in working memory. The representation in working memory is then com-
pared to the representation of a reference duration, or a temporal scale. The exploration
of these later mechanisms of temporal processing has received less interest in the study
of interval timing (Wearden, 2004), but is important for understanding how information
accumulated during a time interval can be transferred into a behavioural duration judg-
ment. It is conceivable that at least part of the effects of stimulus dynamics described
in the introduction actually affect temporal processing at later stages. Research on tem-
poral processing in animals has shown that the memory stage can be selectively affected
by specific drugs (Meck, 1983). Recently, Cai and Wang (2014) showed that with human
participants, numerical stimulus magnitude selectively biases the stage at which a repre-
sentation of the stimulus duration is formed in memory, but does not affect the retrieval
of this representation. It is thus conceivable that the flicker presented in Studies II and
III affects the memory representation of the stimulus and therefore biases the comparison
with the memorized reference durations (that were learned based on non-flickering stim-
uli). This assumption could easily be tested by presenting reference durations at variable
frequencies and testing whether the relative difference in frequency between the reference
duration and the test duration explains the temporal dilation.
5.6 Limitations and suggestions for further research
Part of the work described here — especially the tests of hypotheses derived from sen-
sory models of interval timing — resulted in so-called negative findings, which are no
less important than positive findings. They are, however, harder to interpret and much
harder to communicate. The exact mechanisms of interaction between visual perceptual
processing and temporal processing might still seem like a black box, but our work has
contributed to narrowing the box by excluding the very early sensory stage from the list
of likely candidates. It would be interesting to validate the findings presented here with
different approaches. For example, it would be preferable to acquire a less explicit mea-
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sure of perceived duration. Currently, participants in timing studies are asked to verbalize
their duration judgments, or express them in a dichotomous form. Maybe if we had more
sensitive assessment techniques for perceived duration more subtle effects, like the one of
invisible flicker on perceived duration, could be measured.
The three studies presented here, employ timing tasks and measures to assess the
questions of interest from different points of view. It is difficult to interpret and integrate
the results acquired with different tasks and measurements. However, this diversity re-
flects very well the literature on temporal processing, embracing many different tasks and
different analysis techniques, making assumptions about different models, and examining
different ranges of duration. Thus, the literature on temporal processing is extremely scat-
tered and an effort should be made to classify and review the present reports, according
to the underlying models, the tasks used, and the time range of interest.
Despite copious effort put in the study of temporal processing, we are far from
understanding the mechanisms underlying the ubiquitous percept of time. A recent report
states: “Indeed, given the diversity of the competing models, one may be inclined to state
that researchers are actually clueless concerning the question of how the brain processes
time” (Wittmann, 2013). Why is it so difficult to study the mechanisms of temporal
processing? One of the problems is that no one really knows what time is. We cannot
measure time, as we can measure light or sound waves, but the devices built to measure
times (clocks) actually create their own time based on an internal rhythm. There is no
such thing as a purely temporal stimulus that could be used in psychological experiments.
When asking participants to judge perceived duration, we have to present lights or tones,
or other sensory stimuli. As shown by this work and many others, all these aspects of the
stimuli have influence on perceived duration and make it difficult to study pure timing
in the sense of William James. On the other hand, time is always present, and temporal
processing might underlie many (if not most) cognitive functions. Therefore, temporal
processing cannot be studied in isolation. An interdisciplinary effort is required to frame
the important questions that need to be answered, to develop better models of timing and
to study the brain processes associated with it.
Timing has been studied as a perceptual process, although we know that time cannot
be perceived like light or sound. The localisation of temporal accumulation in areas that
are associated with motor functions might imply that timing is in general more related
to motor behaviour than to perception. A recent study which has shown that temporal
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estimates are more precise for pictures that imply action than for still pictures (Moscatelli
et al., 2011) supports a close relationship between timing and motor behaviour. The
passive perception of duration as it is currently assessed by timing tasks is probably not a
good model of the timing behaviour that is important for the successful interaction with a
dynamic environment. Since time is most important when interacting with the world, we
should probably study time more in the way we study motor action. Instead of assessing
duration judgments, we should probably focus on temporal expectations, which might
provide a more ecologically valid measure to study temporal processing in the brain.
5.7 Conclusions
In hindsight, we can now say that the mechanisms of sensory perception and the mecha-
nisms of duration perception are more distinct than assumed at the outset of this work.
Sensory models of interval timing provide the appealing hypothesis, that duration is en-
coded in the activation triggered by processing of sensory stimuli (whose duration we are
timing). However, here we have demonstrated that this is not the case. Perceived changes
seem to influence duration perception in a much more abstract way, possibly mediated
by attention. Future studies should investigate temporal processing more with respect
to the function it subserves in a dynamic environment than as a passive percept, which
might require an interdisciplinary effort. This effort should be worthwhile, since solving
the puzzle of subjective time will greatly enhance our understanding of the brain.
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